party democracy'. In the wider context, this mechanism is reinforced by its Maoist variant known as 'from the masses and to the masses'. In essence this means the Party must go to the masses or 'patriotic citizens' to collect and collate ideas from them, then organize and otherwise add new input to produce a coherent and constructive set of policies and then take them back to the masses, educate and otherwise induce the masses to embrace such ideas as their own. 4 As far as the Party is concerned its leadership 'is a fundamental guarantee for the Chinese people to be masters in managing the affairs of their own country'. 5 When the Communist Party refers to 'democracy' this is generally the meaning it has in mind.
Indeed, the leading role and position of the Party continues to be enshrined in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the basic principle that underpins the political system. 6 This is the only one of the 'four cardinal principles' that Deng Xiaoping put forth at the start of the reform period, and the only provision in the state constitution, that is strictly upheld. 7 The CCP remains the 'vanguard party' and 'guardian of the people'. As such it not only maintains its long-standing repressive capacities but also devises and implements a development model that seeks to deliver growth, employment, stability, order, prosperity and improved governance for the ordinary people.
Under Jiang Zemin this approach was described in terms of 'the Three Represents', a concept articulated in July 2001. Jiang proclaimed that 'The whole Party must always maintain the spirit of advancing with the times and constantly extend Marxist theory into new realms … give top priority to development in governing and invigorating the country and constantly break new ground and open up a new prospect in the modernization drive… [and] improve its Party building in a spirit of reform and constantly inject new vitality into itself'. 8 Jiang did not spell out clearly his formulation except the fundamental importance of upholding the leading role of the Party with a new requirement. It was to broaden the basis of the Party from an alliance of workers and peasants to include the culturally advanced and economically vibrant elements of society. The private space in which individuals could seek work or personal fulfilment without engaging in activities the Party deemed threatening to its supremacy was enlarged.
After Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang this formulation was replaced by a policy of promoting a socialist harmonious society. In Hu's words 'a harmonious society should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality' in order to produce 'lasting stability and unity'. 9 What happened in reality was more complex. While the general trend in enlarging the private space for individuals to engage in many different kinds of activities was sustained, the Party also enhanced its capacity to identify those who might pose a challenge to its monopoly of power,
and to eliminate such potential threats as soon as they were detected.
As Xi takes the reins of power, Hu's formulation no longer gets wide publicity. But the same basic ideas are incorporated and encapsulated in the 'China dream' that Xi regularly reiterates.
Whether it is put in the language of Xi, Hu or Jiang, the fundamental principle has remained essentially the same. It is for the Party to adapt in order to improve its capacity to stay in power. This is to be achieved, when the general conditions in the country are benign, by the Party dominated government machinery delivering improvements in governance, reaching out to the general public, redressing public grievances and improving living conditions. In the leadership change year of 2012, there were strong pent-up public discontents over the scale and reach of corruption which caught the public imagination as the powerful leader of Chongqing Bo Xilai was removed from office. 10 Hence, Xi promptly appointed Wang Qishan, widely seen as the member of the new Politburo Standing Committee least prone to corruption, to spearhead an anti-corruption drive, after he succeeded Hu.
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As a political system consultative Leninism seeks to pre-empt popular demand for liberal democracy or constitutionalism. 12 It dedicates itself to sustaining a benevolent and efficient oneparty system that practises democratic centralism. In so doing the Party retains its Leninist character and structure. This implies maintaining the capacity and the political will to use whatever means it deems necessary to stay in power should this policy fail to achieve its desired result and the Party's political supremacy is challenged. Consultative Leninism prefers to use smart or well-focused repression and, where practicable, inducements adroitly to eliminate or neutralize challenges to the Party as soon as such challenges are detected in order to pre-empt or reduce the need to resort to dramatic large-scale or summary repression.
Enhancing governance
Consultative Leninism promotes 'good governance with Chinese characteristics'. What this means needs to be contextualized carefully. The 'Chineseness' in this formulation should not be confused with traditional Chinese culture or genuine Confucian values. The traditional Chinese concept of 'the ideal government … is one which is efficient, fair, honest and paternalistic, yet non-intrusive vis-à-vis the life of the ordinary people'. 13 This contradicts the basic nature of the CCP as a Leninist institution, which is about proactively leading, directing and mobilizing the general population to support all aspects of development as the Party sees fit.
In defining good governance with Chinese characteristics the Party looks back into both its own relatively short history and China's long history for inspiration. It also examines ideas and experience from outside of China as it constructs an alternative model to democratization that is suited to the 'special conditions of China'. As Xi Jinping explained, 'with regard to our cultural tradition and those from outside the country, we must make the old serve the present and those originating in the West useful for China' today. 14 Leninism, a Russian import, is therefore no less
Chinese for this purpose than, say, Confucianism.
A particularly important set of lessons the Party has learned are the causes that led to the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 15 Xi felt that the most important point about the fall of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was that 'nobody was man enough to stand up and resist' Mikhail Gorbachev. 16 This reinforces the moral the Party took from the Beijing protests centred on Tiananmen Square in 1989 -that popular protests got out of hand as internal divisions at the top became public knowledge after the Party failed to act quickly and decisively when an unauthorized mass gathering was allowed to take place in the form a vigil commemorating the death of Hu Yaobang. 17 Since he took over Xi has insisted on returning to traditional Leninist discipline to pre-empt the risk of the CCP following the fate of the CPSU. 18 The
Party has further examined the experience of the 'Asian tiger economies' under authoritarian rule, particularly that of Singapore. 19 The final product is, however, what the Party chooses to put together regardless of origins, which it labels as a distinctly modern Chinese approach.
The chosen instrument to deliver good governance is the Party itself. 20 It is an instrument that requires constant reform and updating. The Party seeks to do so by broadening 'its membership base, promoting a new generation of leaders, reformulating its ideological content, appealing to nationalist impulses in society, strengthening its organizational apparatus throughout the country, and opening the channels of discourse within the party and between the party-state and society'. 21 Such an approach, which is reinforced by increasing institutionalization and merit-based promotion, has made its brand of authoritarianism resilient.
More specifically the Party has introduced reforms in the political arena aimed at enhancing its own capacity and that of the state to govern effectively. It should be emphasized that such reforms are not meant to be political changes in the direction of democratization but administrative and other changes intended to pre-empt the need for democratization. 22 The Party uses 'a mix of measures to shore up popular support, resolve local protests, and incorporate the beneficiaries of economic reform into the political system'. 23 Reforms, including anti-corruption drives, are deemed necessary to enhance positively its governance capacity and its assertion of legitimacy. At the same time the Party also 'forcefully represses efforts to challenge its authority and monopoly on political power and organization'. 24 Since Hu Jintao succeeded Jiang Zemin the Party has paid more attention to the general population as a means to enhance the governance capacity of the Party. It does so by selectively putting into practice some Maoist ideas or practices. They include, for example, reviving the principle of democratic centralism, 25 as well as making a public commitment to redress the neglect and abuse faced by the rural population, who had been left behind in the rush towards fastest possible growth under Jiang.
This suggests a stronger recognition that the Party must deliver social justice in order to preempt discontent in the countryside from developing into a major source of instability. 26 Hu publicly advocates that the government should 'provide improved public services for the country's citizens'. 27 He takes the view that 'the biggest danger to the Party … has been losing touch with the masses' and the Party leadership must therefore 'focus on the core issue of the inextricable link between the Party and the masses'. 28 This basic approach seems to have been followed by Xi. Even though it is doubtful if Xi's anti-corruption drive will in fact end systemic corruption, it goes a significant way in appeasing the general public. The ostentatious display of ill-gotten gains or lavish entertainment by officials at public expense has dramatically been reduced after Xi rose to the top.
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The approach adopted by Xi and Hu reflects awareness of how effective some of the Maoist mobilization and propaganda methods are, and a preparedness to revive some of them.
Increasing institutionalization and merit-based promotion
Consultative Leninism relies on institutionalization to make Chinese politics less volatile. The most important achievement in this regard is the introduction of an institutionalized way to manage the generational succession. When Jiang's 'third generation' leadership handed over to Hu's 'fourth generation' leaders in 2002-3 it was the first time that an heir-apparent successfully took over as planned. This is a significant landmark as all previously anointed successors, from Liu Shaoqi to
Zhao Ziyang, ended their careers in dramatic and in most cases tragic circumstances. Hu's relatively uneventful succession to Jiang was meant to set a precedent. but it is becoming structured, stable and basically predictable -indeed, much more predictable than possible in a genuine democratic system. As a political system consultative Leninism supports collective leadership with an identifiable top leader but limits (though it cannot eliminate) the scope for the rise of a strong man.
Greater institutionalization also means the increasing importance of enforcing the law and containing corruption. In sharp contrast to the Maoist era when the law was reduced to irrelevance, the Party has resorted to rule by law. 30 Whereas the judicial system was a shambles just over three decades ago, China now has roughly 200,000 judges, 160,000 prosecutors and 150,000 registered lawyers at work to improve the quality of justice administered. Although the Party and its top leadership remain above the law and there is no indication that they are individually or collectively willing to subject themselves to the law, it does occasionally allow one of their own to face the force of the law as guided by the Party where it is in the interest of the current top leadership for this to happen, as was the case in the trial of Bo Xilai.
What is being put in place is not the rule of law, essential for democracy to function properly and flourish, but rule by law. It means that in cases with no political implications, the law is increasingly being upheld and the Communist Party seeks to govern through the enforcement of the law rather than in spite of the law. 31 Under consultative Leninism, the Party retains leadership over the judiciary. The improvements in the criminal justice system have meant substantial reduction in cases of human rights abuse even though political activists and dissidents are treated no less harshly than under Deng, as reflected in the cases of, say, the Nobel peace prize winner Liu
Xiaobo and dissident artist Ai Weiwei. Indeed, the Chinese government required all lawyers 'to swear an oath of loyalty to the "leadership of the Chinese Communist party" and the "holy mission of socialism with Chinese characteristics"' in 2012. 32 But substantial improvements had been made in the criminal justice system particularly during Xiao Yang's tenure as President of the Supreme People's Court (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . Xiao focused on improving training and standards of judicial personnel in order to reduce gross abuses that used to be endemic in the criminal justice system.
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Although this did not eliminate or even significantly reduce political interference into the judicial system, its resultant improvement in the administration of justice in criminal cases was valuable in enhancing the credibility of the regime and thus the Party's governance capacity.
As far as corruption is concerned the Party recognizes the importance in tackling it. But the Party cannot stamp out systemic corruption as China lacks the necessary institutional checks and balances against corruption as well as the rule of law. Unchecked power corrupts. Nevertheless, despite considerable public scepticism, the Party has managed to limit the damage corruption does to its legitimacy. 34 It does so by launching periodic high profile attempts to contain the ills of corruption and by requiring the media to report known cases as failings of specific officials and not of the Party or of the central government. The Party's efforts to contain corruption are also needed to limit the erosion of its capacity to exert party discipline as required under Leninism albeit of the consultative variant.
The ascendance of the younger generations of leaders has brought about another major change from the past, when the top positions were held almost exclusively by revolutionary veterans. This generational change meant that technocrats had replaced the revolutionary cadres holding all the top offices by the time Jiang became the genuine core of the third generation leadership in 1997 or when consultative Leninism took shape. The technocrats have a different outlook from the 'old revolutionaries'. 35 They recognize that none of them can really take over Deng Xiaoping's mantle as the paramount leader. 36 They cannot justify their hold on power by their revolutionary pedigree as founders of the PRC or veterans of 'the revolutionary war' or of the Long March. Instead they must do so by demonstrating their competence and political skills in keeping others in line.
This has led to a greater acceptance of proven ability or record. Since the legitimacy of the Party's rule after 1989 has been based in part on a de facto social contract that the people will acquiesce in the continuation of its monopoly of power as long as it delivers continuous improvements in living conditions, improving the governing capacity of the Party is vital. The other element that sustains this de facto social contract, namely that the Party's political dominance should not be challenged as it has the will and the means to use force to suppress any such attempt, also requires a strengthening of the administrative capacity of the Party. With the technocrats lacking the standing Deng Xiaoping enjoyed in the armed forces that enabled him to deploy the army to stage the crackdown in June 1989 despite the initial public articulation of reservation within the military establishment, their rise to power provides a strong incentive to pre-empt a crisis that will necessitate a similar military crackdown. Since the technocrats cannot count on the military to repress popular unrests in the way that Deng could, they have less scope to ignore public opinions.
This means that consultative Leninism sought to enhance governance capacity by recruiting and promoting on merit. 37 The Party's objective is to secure a 'high quality contingent of Party leaders that are competent for ruling the country and handling state affairs'. 38 39 The latter quality also counts as a 'merit' as the capacity to garner support or at least neutralize opposition within the establishment is an important requirement to function effectively in consultative
Leninism. By adopting a system that enables the more able administrators and political operators to rise more quickly, the Party ensures that its upper echelons are filled by individuals who are able to work effectively within the existing political system.
Strengthening consultative capacity
While consultative Leninism is meant to pre-empt democratization, ironically its adoption also involves the introduction of some changes that are commonly seen in democratization. They include not only expanding good governance practices but also allowing for a greater scope for civil liberties and for political participation. In terms of greater political participation the most important 'electoral' defeat, whereas the percentage was set at the higher figure of 11.3 per cent for those nominated as alternate members of the Central Committee. 41 The Chinese government has also experimented with township level elections since the turn of the century on the basis of experimentation with village level elections introduced since the 1980s. 42 Admittedly such developments do not amount to genuine democratic exercises as the Party can and generally does secure its desired electoral outcomes, but they do enlarge the scope for election. 43 The Party has also made a point of consulting more external individuals and organizations than before. Important gestures underlining the Party and the government's commitment to do so range from reaffirming the right of existing consultative institutions to criticize specific government policies to the use of the new media as an opinion forum, to allowing greater scope for civil society to operate. 44 Wen's public performance focused public attention on the efforts being led by the top leadership and directed media coverage to showcase the rescue efforts rather than the suffering of the victims. 49 It distracted attention, even of the international media, from raising obvious questions about China's less than perfect rescue operation. The Chinese government's decision not to permit foreign rescue teams to enter Sichuan immediately after the scale of the earthquake was known meant that irreplaceable time for rescuing victims from collapsed buildings was lost. In the end the first external or foreign rescue teams were allowed to reach the scene of the earthquake on day four, when experience elsewhere established that by then relatively few survivors trapped under rubble could be pulled out alive. Whatever the government's considerations were for such a decision, the adroit management of the public image of the rescue operations allowed the importance of this specific inhumane decision to go largely unnoticed.
By seizing the moral high ground promptly and turning public reactions to the disaster into a nationalist response the Party made it possible to win wide praise and support from the country generally and to deflect the inevitable criticisms on specific failings in the rescue and relief operation. Where such criticisms could not be silenced, they were directed against the inadequate performance of lower level officials in Sichuan and thus avoided criticism being directed against the overall performance of the Party. This effective use of propaganda to shape public opinion helps to sustain its positive image and moral authority which, in turn, reinforces its governance capacity and legitimacy. In addition, by beaming images of 'Grandpa Wen' at the front of the disaster zone, the Party reached out to the general public nationwide in a paternalistic way. Through its well-oiled propaganda machine it created a heroic image of Premier Wen and soldiers of the People's Liberation Army saving victims of a natural disaster in the front line and under the overall leadership of the Party General Secretary. Thus, even in a situation where public opinions were being formed and changed quickly, the Party leadership seized the moment to control, shape and direct public opinion. This further enabled the Party to claim credit unobtrusively for galvanizing the country to respond proudly as a nation, once the outpouring of sympathy nationwide turned into self-organized non-government organization (NGO) based efforts to help the victims. For a short time NGOs were given space to help to deal with the aftermath of the earthquake but the non-local volunteers or NGOs were squeezed out after six months. 50 With its moral authority affirmed, the Party was able to require NGOs to co-operate without appearing overly heavy-handed.
This shows an important improvement in governance capacity as the Party allowed a much larger scope than usual for NGOs to take civic action at a time of a major natural disaster. But it also reveals the existence of a strategy for the Party to play a leadership role in directing the efforts of NGOs. The approach adopted is to treat civil society like a bird in a cage. The Party is prepared to enlarge the cage as it sees fit but a cage is nonetheless maintained. This is to ensure that civil society can have sufficient scope to operate in the non-critical realm while its ambition to extend its scope to the critical realm is contained so that the development of civil society cannot pose a threat to the continuation of Party rule. Indeed, consultative Leninism seeks to make NGOs help the Party efforts to move the country forward under its leadership. Since he came to power, Xi has reaffirmed or, indeed, reinforced this approach.
Economic pragmatism
Since the start of the reform period under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, pragmatism guided the management of China's economy. But it took time for the old command economy to be transformed and for the mentality of policy-makers to adjust. The 'bird cage approach' for managing the economy, as explained by party elder Chen Yun, was clearly applied in the earlier half of the reform period. In this conception the economy was the bird and the scope for it to develop was the cage and the Party was willing to enlarge the cage as long as the performance of the bird justified it, but the Party could and did reduce the cage when required. Indeed, China's economy is neither a free market nor a command economy. It is a mixed one where private capital now has huge scope to invest in almost whatever it deems the most profitable lines of manufacturing, trade or service provision. It is also one where state or publicly owned enterprises enjoy great privileges and government patronage, and are still subject to government direction. In a nutshell the Party leadership has enlarged the bird cage so much that the bird largely developed without finding itself seriously constrained by the cage most of the time. But pragmatism has its limits so far. The cage has not been removed.
As Xi, Premier Li Keqiang and the rest of the leadership work out a strategy to rebalance the Chinese economy in the coming decade, they will consult China's best economists in think tanks and in academia as well as corporate leaders, and engage in dialogues with major foreign governments and corporate partners, but the Leninist nature of the regime will also assert itself. As i. widening the social safety net and raising household incomes and, ultimately, consumption;
ii. removing the distortions in relative prices -mainly in the exchange rate and input costs -to exploit real comparative advantages and make the model more sustainable;
iii. reducing the government's interference in the allocation of resources; and iv. liberalizing the financial system, which would allow for a more efficient and effective intermediation of savings. 51 Such changes implicitly require the Party to relinquish some of the most powerful levers it holds over the economy and allow the market to function more effectively and empower ordinary citizens as consumers. It amounts to finding an alternative to the 'bird cage' approach which has served the Party well since 1978. The requirements are not unknown to the Party leadership but implementing them will still prove difficult, as giving up control on anything that can potentially undermine the Party's political hegemony is anathema to consultative Leninism. Whether under Xi's leadership, the consultative Leninist system will be able to do what Hu failed to deliver in this regard in the previous decade remains to be seen.
Nationalism: the new state ideology
The last defining feature of consultative Leninism is the promotion of nationalism as the new ideological force that binds the country together under the leadership of the Party. After
Communism in effect ceased being the state ideology, the CCP had to put in place a new ideological framework. This was in part a reaction to the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as the Chinese establishment feared social and national disintegration following 'the decline of the traditional ideology'. 52 It was also because the Party intended to prevent Western values and beliefs from captivating Chinese citizens living in an ideological void. 53 In any event, the provision of an ideological binding force was needed to enable the Leninist system function effectively.
The choice of nationalism as the new though informal state ideology is meant to enhance the Party's capacity to stay in power on two mutually reinforcing ways. It is to provide a new ideological basis for legitimacy on one hand and to serve as a new rallying force to develop a national aspiration around the leadership of the Party on the other. After the cleavages created between the Party and the ordinary people by the Tiananmen Massacre, the top leaders found nationalism 'the most reliable claim to the Chinese people's loyalty and the only important value shared by the regime and its critics'. 54 They thus 'moved quickly to position themselves as the defenders of China's national pride' and unity. 55 Few Chinese citizens in fact know the history of their country well but they have all been indoctrinated in the greatness of China's long civilization and unity, as well as the iniquity of the 'century of humiliation' when China suffered from Western imperialism after 1838. 56 The historical narrative chosen is outwardly a 'pan-Chinese' one. But in reality it is a Han-centric view of the history of greater China, in which minorities like Tibetans and Uighurs are written into Chinese history as Mongolians and Manchurians have been incorporated.
Any ethnic group thus 'honoured' by their inclusion into China's history will be deemed traitorous should they try to assert their own national identity and separate historical narratives. The nationalism thus promoted is essentially xenophobic in nature, which encourages the Chinese people to identify with a rising China under the leadership of the Party in juxtaposition against the West that is portrayed as uncomfortable with China's resurgence and historic unity. 57 More specifically, the Party has launched an extensive propaganda and educational campaign to indoctrinate the people in patriotism. It is one that requires the citizens of the PRC to participate in affirming 'the rightness and acceptability of the state, its values, policies and agencies'. 58 The core of this campaign is to emphasize 'how China's unique national conditions make it unsuitable to adopt Western style liberal democracy' and how China's existing political system helps to 'maintain political stability, a prerequisite for rapid economic development'. The Chinese government might have failed to silence all grieving parents but it could divert their anger from the central government to specific individuals or departments at the local level and reduce the negative impact on its own credibility. 64 Galvanizing the nation to focus on the 'heroic' rescue operations of the People's Liberation Army apparently personally superintended by Premier
Wen was the key to this success.
All indications since Xi assumed leadership point towards even greater emphasis being put on nationalism. Within a month of his elevation, Xi explained to sailors in Guangzhou that the 'China dream' was about national revival, and it was about both the building of a strong country
and powerful armed forces that should be totally loyal to the Party. 65 His invocation of national victimhood in China's 'century of humiliation' provides the basis for foreign observers to see him as unashamedly appealing to emotion. 66 As elaborated in the Party's theoretical journal, Qiushi, the 'China dream' is about 'merging the dreams of the individual with the dream of the country, of the nation, and of the people, and to put the interest of the individual, of the country, of the nation and of the people together as a whole'. 67 This focus on national revival in Xi's China dream suggests that he is at least as committed as, if not even more so than, his predecessor to use nationalism as the state ideology to galvanize the country in support of consultative Leninism.
Conclusion
As a leader Xi Jinping clearly intends to leave his mark. The launch of the 'China dream'
propaganda line is designed to showcase his new approach, compared to that of his predecessor. But it is built solidly on the basis of the consultative Leninist political system already in place.
Consultative Leninism has given China arguably as resilient a political system as it can have without democracy. The resilience is rooted in the ruthless repressive capacity inherent in what remains an essentially Leninist political machinery. It is strengthened by incorporating various consultative elements and a new ideology that has much wider appeal than Communism. By modernizing the regime's capabilities to monitor and direct public opinion and instil a sense of patriotic duty in its citizens to support the government, the Party has built up a significant capacity to deflect public discontent away from itself. By enhancing its ability to detect challenges as they emerge and remove most of them, either by co-optation or by smart (i.e., relatively well-focused)
repression, before they become major threats to the system, consultative Leninism has lowered the need to resort to large-scale summary repression. This implies reduced exposure to risks that can destabilize or break the system in a fundamental way.
Consultative Leninism is not a system that was specifically designed to replace the Maoist In general terms as consultative Leninism consolidates the Party gains in confidence and competence. As it does so it allows greater scope than previously for experimentation in finding ways to enable China to develop without moving towards democracy. Corporatist ideas are taken on board where they appear to work. A larger sphere is allowed for civil society to operate as long as the Party feels confident that it can keep NGOs in line when and where required. Reinvigoration of specific Maoist or highly modified Confucian ideas has also been adopted where the Party believes they can enhance its ability to govern or improve its moral authority. But the bottom line remains unchanged -the dominance of the Party, even if intra-party reforms, such as greater 'inner party democracy', may appear to make the top leader more responsive to others than his predecessors. spending massively on infrastructure projects to rekindle short-term growth. But it resisted the much needed rebalancing of the economy to make its growth sustainable on a long-term basis. By transforming the political system into consultative Leninism, the Party has built the most powerful and resilient authoritarian system dedicated to keeping itself in power. As long as the central leadership stays united and determined to nip all challenges in the bud, it should be able to perpetuate its hold on power.
Consultative Leninism has now been adopted by Xi Jinping as the basis to build the 'China dream' as he defines it. While its capacity should not be underestimated, there is a question over how sustainable this will prove over the long term. Export-driven growth in China will slow down as the demographic surplus turns into a demographic deficit, the environmental degradation becomes intolerable, and the scope for using infrastructural investments to generate growth exhausted. To pre-empt such an eventuality, China will need to rebalance its economy and find an alternative model to secure sustainable growth and economic stability. This requires consultative
Leninism to change fundamentally and move out of its comfort zone. Whether it can do so or not remains unknown. Should the eventuality outlined above materialize, whether the Party leadership would be able to hang together is an open question. Xi's 'China dream' seeks to pre-empt such eventualities by making consultative Leninism more effective. Consultative Leninism may not last in the very long term, but it only needs to survive a decade for Xi to proclaim how much his 'China dream' has done for the country as he retires in a decade.
